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WHITMAN AND MATHEMATICS:               
AN INTRODUCTION
BLAKE BRONSON-BARTLETT
[T]he anatomist chemist astronomer geologist phrenologist 
spiritualist mathematician historian and lexicographer are not 
poets, but they are the lawgivers of poets and their construction 
underlies the structure of every perfect poem.
—Whitman, Preface to Leaves of Grass1 
THIS SPECIAL ISSUE of WWQR anticipates a sustained dialogue about 
the long-neglected relationship between numbers and letters in Whit-
man’s writings.2 Each featured essay proves in its own way that this 
dialogue is overdue: Whitman was well acquainted with mathematics 
in the schoolroom and thus in the growth of American democracy; 
his poems bear witness to the historically specific and multi-faceted 
cultural role of mathematics in the mid-nineteenth-century United 
States. Just as importantly, the essays collected here demonstrate how 
the Digital Humanities have conditioned this new subject, bringing 
calculation and non-alphabetic notation to the attention of twen-
ty-first-century literary historians. This era of digital galleries, data 
mining, and colorful charts and graphs may also help us explore how 
the alphabetical and the numerical—poetry and mathematics—divide 
and recombine at different points in cultural history. 
That said, the impetus for this special issue is neither technologi-
cally determined nor unprecedented. On the contrary, the relationship 
between Whitman and mathematics is particularly enticing for the 
fits and starts of attention it has received over the past three quarters 
of a century: Muriel Rukeyser’s 1942 biography of mathematician 
Willard Gibbs, a prescient M.S. thesis written in 1965 by budding 
mathematician Kathryn Davies Lindsay, and a pair of close readings 
from 1989 and 1991 by Sister Charlotte Downey.3 With no sustained 
attempt to account for or to develop the approaches advanced in this 
minor corpus of secondary sources, research on Whitman and math-
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ematics has had little hope of thriving. Add to this the fact that as a 
“scientific” influence on Whitman, mathematics has, understandably, 
been overshadowed by sciences that figure prominently in the poet’s 
biography and the thematics of his writings, such as the medical4 and 
the natural sciences.5 But even contextual overviews of the impact 
nineteenth-century popular sciences, from phrenology to astronomy, 
had on Leaves of Grass ignore the influence of nineteenth-century 
mathematics.6 To date, general and particular accounts exclude math-
ematics from Whitman studies—all in spite of the fact that in his 1855 
Preface Whitman himself names mathematicians among the scientific 
“lawgivers of poets.”
The exception is Kathryn Davies Lindsay’s M.S. thesis from 
1965, which was significantly influenced by Muriel Rukeyser’s 
consistent references to Whitman in her biography of mathematician 
Willard Gibbs, the co-inventor (with James Clerk Maxwell) of statis-
tical mechanics and, independently, of vector calculus. In this brief 
introduction, I offer a backward glance over the relationship between 
Whitman and mathematics in the works of Lindsay and (more briefly) 
Rukeyser; I then provide context for and summary remarks on the 
essays in this special issue; lastly, I suggest possible routes of inquiry 
for further research on Whitman and mathematics. 
The Lost M.S. Thesis: Whitman and Set Theory
In her lyric biography of Willard Gibbs, Muriel Rukeyser regularly 
alludes to Whitman, Gibbs’s contemporary, to suggest correspondenc-
es between the poet’s and the mathematician’s modes of theoretical 
system building. Late in the biography, in a chapter that compares 
and contrasts the writings of Whitman, Melville, and Gibbs, Rukey-
ser explains the logic of these correspondences as follows: “The single 
faces of Whitman’s people, the faces of principle in Melville, the stars 
seen as the molecules of a great bubble of gas according to Gibbs, the 
furnaces pouring metal—these are linked” (368). Linked, yes, but 
far from equivalent: for Rukeyser, Gibbs’s mathematical discoveries 
complete the literary achievements of the “American Renaissance.” 
Whitman’s need of refinement is exemplary:
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The failure of [Whitman’s cataloging] method, when it fails, is because he was 
not, like Gibbs, interested in the relations between these facts (or systems) so 
much as in the facts themselves. . . . [I]n Whitman’s clumsy and factual ma-
noeuvre after scientific information, he had absorbed, as he often intuitively did, 
certain fundamentals which he could use in his own method, at his best. When 
he made myth out of this attitude, he reached his own height, and created the 
creative. (360-361)
Unlike Whitman’s creative fumbling with facts for the sake of “his own 
method,” Gibbs transcended himself, creativity itself even, by invent-
ing abstract systems that could be brought to bear on material reality; 
indeed, these systems were ultimately responsible for reshaping the 
future of physics, chemistry, and industry around the world. In Gibbs, 
then, Rukeyser finds a mathematician who could do everything that 
a materialist poet like Whitman imagines himself doing and whom 
Whitman might help non-mathematicians appreciate. However, the 
poet never effectively bridges the gap between “creating the creative” 
and refashioning the world, between the arts and the hard sciences, 
or between poetry and mathematics.
Nevertheless, Rukeyser’s zealous embrace of mathematics in her 
biography of Gibbs inspired Kathryn Davies Lindsay to write her M.S. 
thesis on (of all things) Whitman and mathematics. Her modest tone 
belies the extreme boldness of her endeavor: “If Whitman had a single 
aim in his poetry,” says Lindsay, “it would seem to be to express the 
totality of the universe. . . . Since mathematics deals with the inter-re-
lationship between various quantities, concepts like set theory and 
mathematical series aid in understanding Whitman’s ideas” (66-67). 
Lindsay takes at least one lead from Rukeyser when she notes the 
relationship between Whitman and “mathematical series” (i.e., 3/10, 
3/100, 3/1000, ad infinitum…) (60). Here, Whitman’s multiple “I” 
and expanding lists find their numerical doppelgänger. But Lindsay’s 
comparative analyses of Whitman’s poems using set theory occupy 
the bulk of her thesis and also push the Whitman-mathematics rela-
tionship beyond what Rukeyser allowed for in her biography of Gibbs. 
Set theory, as Lindsay defines it, “is a method of ordering and 
conceiving of a whole in terms of its parts” (7). The relation between 
Whitman and set theory therefore is plain to see: “Starting with 
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familiar objects, absorbing and combining them, Whitman was able to 
communicate the impression of the totality, even though he was listing 
only some of its parts” (8). Lindsay struggles to ground her project 
in extant secondary literature, citing Norman Foerster’s Nature in 
American Literature (1923) and Newton Arvin’s biography Whitman 
(1938), both of which only discuss the poet’s relationship to science 
in general, not mathematics in particular. Lindsay notes that Henry 
Seidel Canby compares Whitman and Gibbs in his Walt Whitman, 
An American (1943), but only to affirm the similarities and differences 
already established by Rukeyser the previous year. Thus Lindsay must 
be given credit for her courage in this matter: where Rukeyser at best 
finds analogies of mathematics in Whitman’s poetry, Lindsay finds 
the two operating in a consistent fashion and from shared assump-
tions.
For Lindsay, the relationship between poetry and mathematics 
is more than analogous:
A major requirement of a mathematical system, consistency to its basic premises, 
is also a requirement for any system of literary thought. A mathematician accepts 
certain truths as self-evident and proceeds to build his conclusions logically from 
these premises. To do so he must carefully define his terms and be constantly 
aware of his aim and purpose. The poet, too, must define his terminology and be 
logically consistent. He must keep in mind the system within which he is work-
ing and constantly order and arrange his ideas according to some preconceived 
pattern. (26) 
Lindsay trusts that poets and mathematicians are not only system 
builders, but that they build their systems the same way: they both 
operate within certain practical and symbolic parameters deter-
mined by the system preceding their acts, intentions, innovations, 
and indeed themselves. Rukeyser, on the other hand, claims the 
opposite, supposing that Whitman was one type of inventor (a poet) 
who lacked the traits of an inventor like Gibbs (a mathematician), 
with a superior set of skills that would have helped the poet discov-
er the combining principle between the facts he clumsily listed in 
his famous catalogs. For Rukeyser, mathematical genius supersedes 
poetic genius by the end of the nineteenth century; for Lindsay, 
there is systemic consistency: set theory and poetics are different 
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expressions that simply need to be reunited. 
Next to Rukeyser, the biggest influence on Lindsay’s thesis is 
Richard Maurice Bucke, whose Cosmic Consciousness (1901) places 
Whitman among such religious visionaries and messianic figures as 
the Buddha and Christ. For her set-theoretical analyses, then, Lindsay 
selects poems “which best expressed and explained the inter-relation-
ship of various parts of the cosmos” (37). Lindsay provides diagrams 
illustrating such inter-relationships of various parts (see Figure 1), but 
she does not guide the reader through the language, symbols, or axioms 
of set theory that she presumably based them on. And yet, the mere 
application of the language and symbols of set theory enhances Lindsay’s 
work and proves to be as illuminating as her visual representations. 
For instance, in “Salut au Monde” the “world” includes (⊂) “man” 
and “geography”; “man” includes (⊂) “inventions of man”; “man” and 
“inventions of man” intersect (∩) with “geography” in the world, but 
they do not include each other.7 The distinctions are significant in the 
langauge of set theory and consequential to the way the poem is read. 
To extrapolate from Lindsay’s diagram: “man” and “geography” consist 
of some but not all elements of the “world”; “geography” appears to 
consist of a larger quantity of elements of the “world” than “man”; and, 
intriguingly, “geography” is not an “invention of man” but intersects, 
or shares at least one element of “man” and the “inventions of man,” 
while not being limited to the circumscribed quantity of elements of 
which “man” or the “inventions of man” consist. 
In her formal assessment of inter-relationships in “Salut au 
Monde,” Lindsay begins reading Whitman as an early post-humanist: 
she depicts “geography” as a form of knowledge that “man” shares 
with the “world,” not one that he has invented or that reveals his 
place in the center of the “world.” This reading of Whitman from a 
mathematical perspective is only one of many that might depart from 
Lindsay’s lost and (now) found M.S. thesis. Further elaboration on 
the variety of logics extrapolated from the poems and the way their 
formalization make some of the more abstract and difficult concepts 
in Whitman’s poems articulable, even teachable, is still to come. But 
first, more context.
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Alphanumeric Romanticism: Mathematics Enters Whitman Studies
Not all of Lindsay’s mathematical interpretations of Whitman are 
based on set theory. She also discusses the role of numerical values 
in Whitman’s poetic tropes: in “A Broadway Pageant,” Manhattan 
is “million-footed”; during his visit to the “orchards of spheres” in 
“Song of Myself,” he looks at “quintillians ripen’d” and “quintillions 
green” (30). Numbers enter into the musicality of “Out of the Cradle 
Endlessly Rocking,” where “two” and “two together” in the second, 
Figure 1. Diagram from Mathematics: A Clue to Whitman’s Philosophy (42).
Figure 2. Diagram from Mathematics: A Clue to Whitman’s Philosophy (47).
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third, and fourth stanzas enrich the incantational, rhythmic charac-
ter, both musical and mathematical, of the poem (33). Lindsay even 
comments on one of Whitman’s most famous notebook entries, his 
heart-wrenching attempt to repress his feelings for Peter Doyle, whose 
initials are numerically encrypted as “164.”8 Lindsay informs us that 
the poet’s use of numbers clearly “shows that Whitman employed 
the mathematical theory of ordered pairs which relates the individual 
members of two separate groups. Perhaps he was aware of the relation-
ship that existed between the alphabet and the first twenty-six numbers 
of the number system” (35). Whitmanists and literary historians may 
take the relationship between the alphabet and the number system 
for granted when they find “164” in place of “PD,” or are faced with 
a “million-footed” city or “quintillions” of spheres ripening through-
out the unknown universe. But as the contributions to this special 
issue demonstrate, the correspondences between numbers and letters 
in Whitman’s writings have more to tell us about acts of reading and 
writing in their mid-nineteenth century contexts.
 No such exploration has endured beyond Lindsay’s M.S. thesis, 
most likely due to the gaping abyss between the rationality and imper-
sonality associated with mathematics and the idiosyncracy and indi-
vidualism associated with Romantic ideals of imagination, originality, 
and authorship in the literary arts. But Lindsay knew, as we do today, 
that this particular abyss is an illusion, a product of artificial disci-
plinary divisions, and that what lies beneath this illusion not only has 
much to teach us about the texts we read but also about the limits 
of our current methodologies. To that point, Rachel Feder’s note for 
this special issue reads “Song of Myself” against the backdrop of 
eighteenth-century concepts of “infinity” (specifically Locke’s) and 
their impact on British Romanticism (namely Wordsworth). Zachary 
Turpin explores the irresolvable and generative tension between letters 
and numbers in Leaves of Grass, while considering some of the theo-
retical roots of that tension in Whitman’s time as in ours.
The full-length essays featured in this issue propose surprising 
new approaches to Whitman’s writings: the numerical as well as rhetor-
ical value of Whitman’s apostrophes; the non-lexical markup found 
throughout his archived manuscripts; his need to distinguish between 
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the mathematical idealism that informed his antebellum writings and 
the morbid statistics of mass death during the Civil War. The latter case 
in particular explains why Whitman himself may have been instru-
mental in perpetuating a mythological division between mathematics 
and poetry—that is, the cold tallies of dead soldiers will not heal a 
nation on the mend. But Leaves of Grass is as much a book of internal 
conflict, disunion, and war as it is a book of forgiveness, reunion, and 
love. 
The essays have in common a relatively unexplored aspect of the 
intellectual formation of nineteenth-century Americans: arithmeti-
zation. Alphabetization itself has only recently been welcomed into 
literary studies from the margins of cultural history thanks to scholars 
like Patricia Crain, whose work has thoroughly demonstrated how 
this low designation belies the alphabet’s significant role in the oper-
ations of institutional power and its production of lettered subjects.9
The low/high division between alphabetical primers and literature 
are paralleled by basic arithmetic and logic, the schoolroom genre 
and its higher orders of speculation, the everyday fiscal accounts and 
the calculus that builds bridges and digital networks. So, while the 
study of children’s literature has become a rather serious matter in 
American cultural studies and has at least partially redeemed the 
alphabet as a medium worthy of study, numbers and arithmetic have 
yet to achieve this status. The essays featured in this issue not only 
introduce mathematics to Whitman studies, then, but also participate 
in and promote studies in the cultural history of mathematics.
All three essays refer to James B. Thomson’s Practical Arithmetic. 
Thomson’s book provides a solid starting point for exploring Whitman’s 
knowledge of rudimentary math not only because the poet himself 
approved the book for use in public schools in his 1846 review for the
Brooklyn Daily Eagle, but also because it explains the social meanings 
of arithmetic in the antebellum decades. As Thomson states in his 
preface, his Practical Arithmetic “embraces, in a word, all the princi-
ples and rules which the business man ever has occasion to use, and 
is particularly adapted to precede the study of Algebra and the higher 
branches of mathematics.”10 Which is to say that instilling students 
with the rudiments of personal economy is only the beginning of a 
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longer venture into the upper realms opened by numbers. But even 
basic socio-economic necessities begin with the low genre of simple 
counting from one to ten and its correspondence with various graphic 
notation systems. Before teaching his pupils to add and subtract, then, 
Thomson defines notation as the very possibility of Roman letters 
standing for numbers and Arabic numbers standing for exponentially 
expanding units that can be expressed in letters (14-16). 
As Ed Folsom points out in his essay, the “large numbers” that 
appear in the language of Leaves of Grass may be as intmidating to us as 
they were to his contemporary readers: then as now, massive quantities 
are a conceptual menace to individual expression. Yet, given the way 
those readers learned numbers in school, they were arguably “better 
attuned than twenty-first-century audiences to the particular defini-
tions of the numerical terms that Whitman so frequently employed in 
his poetry.” In addition to noting Whitman’s positive review and recom-
mendation of Thomson’s work, Folsom directs our attention to another 
primary source from antebellum schoolrooms, Benjamin Greenleaf’s 
Introduction to the National Arithmetic (1847), which recommended 
the alphabetical transcription of “large numbers” as a schoolroom 
exercise, an exercise assuming that the literate student’s slate was an 
interface for translating numbers into letters and back again. The 
branches of this alphanumeric foundation extend beyond the school-
room to the pulpit of baptist minister Eli Noyes, whose published 
sermons integrate speculative thinking in numbers into projections of 
the divine, cosmic infinite. From one institutional context to another, 
from the pragmatism of literate, calculating subjects to the spiritu-
alism of de-individuated transcendence, the operations of numbers 
were everywhere in the antebellum decades. 
Contributing their own generous overview of mathematics in 
its early nineteenth-century institutional contexts, Matt Cohen and 
Aaron Dinin focus on the numerical traces found in Whitman’s manu-
scripts, to show us that calculation was instrumental to the poet’s 
writing process. Whether rudimentary calculations allowed him to 
locate his work in history or to plan the next edition of Leaves of Grass, 
mathematics is inseparable from Whitman’s conception of himself as 
a poet, printer, and bookmaker. Cohen and Dinin also suggest that 
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our digital moment, which is ushering in a new era of manuscript 
studies, has begun to draw us out of an alphabetical regime and to 
position us at the beginning of a new one that looks back over the 
neo-Romanticism of Harold Bloom as well as the Marxist historicism 
of Alan Trachtenberg, with a lens attuned to the markup, formats, 
and thus material, formal, and mathematical elements involved in 
literary writing.
Along similarly post-Romantic and post-Marxian lines, Stefan 
Schöberlein demonstrates in his essay that, in Whitman’s day, numer-
ical calcuations, while employed in commercial activity, were recruited 
for manifold purposes, from disclosing the functions of the universe 
to tallying the mass death of the Civil War. For Schöberlein, the very 
children that learned numbers and letters in public schools were later 
counted like mere figures in a massive, bloody account book, a book 
that Whitman saw filled as he visited wounded and dying soldiers in 
the hospitals of Civil War Washington. For similar reasons, Folsom 
argues in his essay that Whitman’s faith in large numbers, which influ-
enced early poems such as “Song of Myself,” “This Compost,” and 
“Unnamed Lands,” lapsed during the war; the poet’s once prolific 
catalogs became morbid lists of loss and absence in his fragmentary, 
multi-genre memoir Memoranda During the War. To demonstrate how 
profoundly the war impacted Whitman’s writings, Folsom provides 
a thrilling reading of the apostrophe in the section of Memoranda
titled “The Million Dead, Too, Summ’d Up”: the apostrophe not 
only causes the word “summ’d” to vacillate between the mathematical 
“summed” and the spiritual “summoned,” but also marks the absence 
of the “one” now obliterated by the masses of unknown dead. Here, 
the apostrophe is not so much a punctuation mark as it is iconic of the 
interface between numbers and letters always at work in Whitman’s 
writings. 
And that continued to work in them: the prolific multiplicities 
of the early catalogs, even after the devastation of the Civil War, says 
Folsom, return as an undeniable truth in the post-bellum poems. 
Schöberlein takes a different tack, stating that Whitman’s revulsion 
at the perverse use of mathematics to tally the mass death of the 
Civil War makes him “unaccountable.” Ultimately, both Folsom’s and 
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Schöberlein’s essays meet on common ground, stating that the Civil 
War transformed Whitman’s conception of the numerical universe, 
which offers cultural historians a narrative, complete with character 
development, for the changing role numbers played in Whitman’s 
poetics from 1855 to 1892. 
New Subjects: “Cultural Mathematics” and Axiomatic Set Theory
In his review of Rukeyser’s biography of Gibbs for the May 12, 1944, 
issue of Science magazine, Edwin B. Wilson wrote:
The author is a literary woman rather than a historian or scientist; she states 
as facts a great many things she can not possibly know, such as what some one 
felt or thought on a given occasion, even though there be no record to indicate 
it. As fictionalized biography has a great present vogue, many must like it and 
some may even consider this one “thrilling” in the places where it is best writ-
ten, though I should think any one must consider a good deal of it as both badly 
written and boresome.11
Presumably, Wilson means to defend Gibbs’s territory, but in doing 
so he assumes that he can lay claim to the “literary woman’s” terri-
tory as well, asserting that “any one must consider” the book “badly 
written and boresome.” Today, the defensiveness and double stan-
dards seem retrograde thanks to philosophers of science, from Michel 
Serres to Karen Barad,12 who have opened a dialogic space between 
disciplines. Yet when mathematics and the humanities come together, 
their encounters remain controversial, even scandalous
 Schöberlein’s essay, the last of the three featured here, draws on 
the late Friedrich Kittler’s “cultural mathematics”: a controversial 
marriage of philology and media history partly worked through in the 
incomplete, not-yet-translated into English, multi-volume magnum 
opus Musik und Mathematik [Music and Mathematics].13 Kittler’s project 
recovers the repressed technical foundations of European culture in 
the Greek alphabet, circa the eighth century BC, when it functioned 
as a universal medium for calculating sums, measuring interval ratios 
(octaves, fifths, fourths, and thirds), and—being the first alphabet to 
distinguish vowels from consonants—recording the voices of epic and 
lyric poets. Since, for Kittler, human senses rely on the media that 
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store and transmit sensory information, the Greek alphabet’s capacity 
for processing numbers, tones, and voices produced a culture based 
on love (not war). Unfinished at Kittler’s death, the projected final 
volumes of Musik und Mathematik were to proclaim the return of the 
repressed Greek notation system in binary code.14 In lieu of his book-
length expositions on the matter, we have intriguing aphorisms, such 
as: “In the Greek alphabet our senses were present—and thanks to 
Turing they are so once again.”15 Kittler’s conception of digital tech-
nology has been rejected by American new media materialists,16 and 
the digital return of ancient Greece has met with skepticism, even 
among supporters: “Many German media scholars regard Kittler as 
having gone off the deep end in his late years, and his most sympathetic 
critics . . . tend to have one foot in, one foot out of German-language 
debates” (Peters 24). However, Kittler’s influence continues to grow 
through special issues of quarterlies, book-length digests of his life’s 
work, and emerging translations.
In his reading of Whitman’s “Eidólons” alongside the “eidola” 
educational interface, Schöberlein demonstrates that our software 
culture already promotes itself as a recurrence of the ancient in the 
digital world. All the better, then, that Kittler’s late work insists on 
close attention to the technical and technological preconditions of 
storage, communication, and implementation then and now. This 
mode of interpretation may prove to be particularly apt for studies 
of Whitman, who is in one sense so representative of late American 
Romanticism and yet so distinct from the Romantics and even his 
contemporaries. After all, the “American bard,” whose poems expect 
nothing less than a merge of author with reader in the print medi-
um—“I pass so poorly with paper and types . . . . I must pass with the 
contact of bodies and souls” (Whitman 57)—may just be a (Kittlerian) 
Greek who was born at the wrong time. Perhaps “the parasitic rela-
tion of one discourse context to another” presented in such jarring 
moments—the “cultivated perversity,” as Michael Warner says, of 
the poet’s merge of the conventions of the publicly printed with the 
nakedly private—is rooted in Whitman’s interests, as evidenced in his 
manuscripts and published works, in the ancient world and his visions 
of a globalized American English.17 There has been very good scholar-
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ship on Whitman’s adventures in the history of language,18 but there 
has also been too little of it. Now that digital resources like the Walt 
Whitman Archive are making the poet’s manuscripts and published 
works accessible and researchable in one virtual space, all manner 
of discoveries and novel readings are likely to emerge, and Kittler’s 
“cultural mathematics” provides one way to theoretically foreground 
how mathematics has always been and continues to be at work in the 
media that produces and reproduces the cultures of a given place and 
time.
Those intrigued by Lindsay’s more abstract, less materialist 
approach to Whitman through set theory might set aside “cultural 
mathematics” and follow a line of inquiry into the interdisciplinary 
fusion of mathematics, philosophy, and literary interpretation found in 
the work of Quentin Meillassoux and, more infamously, Alain Badiou.19
Badiou shares with Kittler a type of epiphanic idiom that proclaims the 
once repressed, now recovered place of mathematics in the history of 
philosophy. “[T]he science of being qua being [ontology] has existed 
since the Greeks,” says Badiou; “such is the sense and status of math-
ematics. However, it is only today that we have the means to know
this” (BE 3). While Badiou has the means to know that ontology and 
mathematics were once the same science (and will be again, if he has 
anything to say about it), mathematicians have denounced his use of 
their tools.20 Their objections may be rooted in the fact that one of 
the more significant axioms for Badiou, the “axiom of choice,” was 
already controversial among mathematicians.21 But Badiou courts 
controversy: “within ontology, the axiom of choice formalizes the 
predicates of intervention” (BE 227); he offers the following example: 
(∀α)(∃ƒ)[(∀β)[(β ∈ α & β∅) → ƒ(β) ∈ β]]
Or “for all α, there is a function (ƒ), for which all β, if β belongs to α, 
and β is not void, then the function of β belongs to β” (BE 226). In other 
words, β may belong to α, but the “function of β” allows for the possi-
bility of choice or chance to intervene and to interrupt its relationship 
of belonging to α. The axiom of choice guarantees the existence of this 
IXQFWLRQDVDJHQHUDOFRQGLWLRQIRUPXOWLSOHVWKDWH[LVW∅), even when 
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they are subordinate multiples, and even though said function itself is 
hypothetical, theoretical, and has not yet been articulated or defined. 
Thus, the possibility of novelty and change—the significant upheaval 
in the given order of the world—is demonstrably “true.” 
The axioms of set theory appear to operate in Badiou’s ontology as 
a type of specialized language for articulating the discontinuities of revo-
lutionary history, and mathematicians and humanists alike no doubt take 
issue with the conflation of formal logic and historical processes.22 Yet 
Badiou, like Rukeyser and Lindsay before him, opts for a high-risk exper-
iment in thought and writing. Perhaps projects like Badiou’s and Kittler’s 
reflect the humanist’s insecurity, a yearning for scientific authority at a 
time when the humanities are undervalued or a vainglorious attempt to 
unite the irreconcilably divided. But union among the divided is also the 
project of Leaves of Grass. 
The contributions to this special issue have begun the work of illumi-
nating how the poet joins the mathematical and the poetical and how their 
encounter informs the revolutionary aesthetics and political commitments 
of his writings, as Whitman studies, once again, attends to the repressed 
figures of cultural history, where even the most abstract symbolic traces 
become interpretable because sensible and sensual. My belief—the belief 
that motivated me to pitch this special issue to Ed Folsom (whose 
graciousness and open mind made it possible in the first place)—is 
that Whitman’s writings support new explorations between numbers 
and letters. Nor should it escape us that to say so is not to make an 
intervention so much as it is to recover some forgotten traces and to 
affirm the golden age of digital scholarship, which comes, of course, 
with all of the attendant dangers and promises that one might expect 
from it.
Technische Universität Dortmund / University of Iowa
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